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Abstract: 
  
Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and 
substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and 
good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and 
weak governance institutions there is no significant difference in support for revising 
privatization between high and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the 
quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising 
privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes 
to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.   
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Introduction 
 The privatization of state enterprises has been a central element of economic reform 
over the last 25 years and by most, but, not all accounts, the beneficial effects of 
privatization have outweighed the costs (e.g., Guriev and Megginson 2007, Megginson and 
Netter 2001, McKenzie and Mookherjee 2003). Yet, for all its benefits, the public reviles 
privatization (Boix 2005, Graham and Sukhtankar 2004, Lora and Panizza 2003, Panizza 
and Yanez 2005). Survey results from 17 Latin American countries in 2003 found that 
almost two-thirds of respondents thought that privatization was “not beneficial” (Lora and 
Panizza 2003). A nationally-representative survey in Russia in 2006 revealed that fifty two 
percent of respondents agreed that “the majority of private assets in the country should be 
nationalized” (Denisova et al. 2007). Given the lack of public support, it is hardly 
surprising that recent years have seen significant reversals of privatization in Bolivia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.   
 Why do some oppose and others support revising market reforms, such as 
privatization?  Existing studies of public support for economic reform have focused almost 
exclusively on the impact of individual-level factors (e.g., Duch 1993; Gibson 1996; 
Kaltenthaler et al. 2006; but see Grosjean and Senik 2008). We advance the literature by 
examining how individual-level traits, such as market skills, interact with national-level 
factors, such as democracy and governance, in shaping support for economic reform. In 
particular, we test whether democracy and good governance complement market-relevant 
skills or substitute for them in transition countries. We use a survey of 28,000 individuals 
from 28 transition countries that is particularly well suited to study how individual 
characteristics and national institutions interact to shape attitudes towards market reform 
because it gathers rich individual-level information comparable across a relatively large 
number of reforming states with diverse institutions. We focus on a crucial component of 
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market reforms in transition countries, i.e., public support for revising privatization. We 
find that under autocracy and weak governance institutions, there is no significant 
difference in the levels of support for revising privatization between respondents with high 
market skills, i.e., entrepreneurs and professionals, and respondents with low market skills, 
i.e., non-entrepreneurs and non-professionals. However, as the level of democracy and the 
quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising 
privatization between individuals with high and low market skills grows dramatically. In 
democratic and well-governed countries, respondents with low market skills support 
revising privatization at a much higher rate than respondents with high market skills. 
Favorable institutional settings allow those with market-relevant skills to reap the full 
returns of their efforts and thereby bolster their support for economic reform. Thus, in the 
postcommunist transition, there exists an important complementarity of a good institutional 
environment and skills useful to economic reforms.  
While many argue that groups who gain from economic reform, such as those with 
the skills most suited for a market economy, will be strong supporters of further economic 
reform (c.f., Fernandez and Rodrik 1991), our study indicates that under autocracy and 
weak governance institutions, the high skilled will be no more supportive of further 
economic reform than the low skilled. It is democracy and good governance that drives a 
wedge between the preferences over economic reform of those with high and low market 
skills.  Thus, our findings help illuminate how democracy and good governance shape the 
microfoundations of the politics of economic policymaking: different coalitions may be 
needed to advance economic reform under autocracy and weak governance, on the one 
hand, and under democracy and good governance, on the other.3   
                                                 
3 For studies of public support for economic reform in the postcommunist world, see Tucker (2006); 
for Latin America, see Baker (2003); for a more general argument, see Stokes et al. (2001). 
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 Our analysis underscores the importance of integrating national-level variables into 
analyses of individual-level preferences over economic policy.  Recent years have seen a 
renewed interest in comparative political economy in this topic.  For example, scholars 
have examined public attitudes toward trade openness, welfare policy, economic reform, 
and integration into the European Union in a broad range of countries (c.f., Hiscox 2002; 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Baker 2003; Tucker 2006).4 These studies have made valuable 
contributions, but have not explored whether and how preferences vary depending on the 
institutional environment. We push this literature forward by identifying the 
complementarity of national-level institutions and individual skills for public support for 
economic reforms.5    
 In Part 1, we develop an argument about the interplay of individual and 
institutional-level factors in determining support for revising privatization. In Part 2, we 
discuss the data and measures.  In Part 3, we present our empirical methodology.  In Part 4, 
we discuss our results. In Part 5, we present robustness checks. In Part 6, we conclude. 
1. Hypotheses: Skills and Institutions 
 The literature on the politics of economic reform typically assumes that people 
evaluate policy ex ante based on its expected impact on their personal welfare and ex post 
based on the realized return from the policy (c.f. Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Roland 
                                                 
4 One potentially relevant area of overlap with our study is those works in the varieties of capitalism 
literature that examine how the institutional environment shapes incentives to invest in specific or 
general skills (c.f, Iversen and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003). 
5 For studies that integrate national-level variables into analyses of individual-level preferences on 
other issues, see, among others,  Steenbergen and Jones (2002); Anderson and Tverdova (2003); 
Duch and Stevenson (2005); and Huber et al. (2005). 
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2000).6 Individuals who gain (or expect to gain) from a change in policy are likely to back 
the change in policy, while those who lose (or expect to lose) oppose it.7  This is a central 
assumption that drives much of the theoretical literature on the political economy of reform 
and has been the subject of considerable empirical scrutiny (c.f., Przeworski 1991; Tucker, 
Pacek and Berinsky 2002; Baker 2003).     
 Scholars have identified a variety of individual traits that influence who benefits 
from economic reforms, such as market liberalization and privatization. These include 
skills, socio-economic status, and location. Our primary focus is on skills relevant to a 
market economy based on the idea that higher levels of market skills are associated with 
greater returns to economic reform and, therefore, more vigorous support for reform.  
Indeed, there is solid evidence that economic reforms are related to differential rates of 
returns to market-relevant skills in transition economies (e.g., Brainerd 1998; Svejnar 
1999). In particular, returns to skills comprise an important component of wage 
decompression in reforming economies (e.g., Milanovic 1999). If under a planned 
economy, returns to market skills were diminished by massive redistribution, the expanded 
opportunities offered by economic reform allow those with the skills most suited to a 
market economy to reap larger gains. The argument is even stronger with respect to 
entrepreneurial skills which were not at all in demand in  a command economy (e.g., Earle 
                                                 
6 There is a large literature on whether citizens evaluate policy and vote based on prospective or 
retrospective evaluations (c.f., Fiorina 1981; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991).  Respondents in our 
sample likely evaluate policy based on the effect of privatization which has already taken place and 
based on the expected future benefits from changing current policy, but we do not explore the 
relative weights of these factors in their responses. See Stokes et al. (2001) for a discussion of 
retrospective and prospective evaluations of economic reform. 
7 Of course, personal pocketbook issues are not the only factor influencing support for policy, but 
there is much evidence that these types of individual material calculations are an important 
consideration. For a discussion of this issue relevant to the politics of economic reform, see Colton 
(2000), pp. 94-95, and Stokes et al. (2001), pp. 1-32. 
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and Sakova 2000). Building on this notion, we expect those with skills most suited to a 
market economy to be the strongest proponents of market reform.  
 Yet, little is known about whether the impact of market skills on support for 
economic reform depends on the institutional environment. Indeed, there are two 
alternative views of how private returns to skills from market-oriented reforms interact 
with the institutional environment. The ability to realize gains from market-relevant skills 
may depend on the extent to which institutions reward those talents. Theoretically, good 
institutions may be complements or substitutes for the private returns from economic 
reform.   
1.1. Complementarity view 
Consider the argument for complementarity. It envisions democracy and good 
governance institutions primarily as a means of constraining rulers from changing policy 
opportunistically and engaging in corruption and rent extraction, thereby allowing citizens 
to realize greater gains from economic reforms (c.f., Zinnes, Eliat and Sachs 2001; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  Secure in the knowledge that state officials are more 
constrained by democratic practices and capable governance institutions, those with the 
skills most suited to a market economy can use their talents to their greatest effect. Low 
skill citizens may still benefit from good governance and democracy, but their returns from 
reform will be lower than for high skill citizens. Given the greater returns to market skills 
from economic reform under good institutions, the high skilled will be stronger proponents 
of market reforms than the low skilled.  
 In weak institutional environments the complementarity view suggests that the 
difference in the responses between those with high and low market skills will be much 
smaller. Weak institutions may prevent individuals with high market skills from realizing 
their potential returns from market reform, and, therefore, they may be much less 
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enthusiastic about supporting economic reform. For example, under autocracy and weak 
governance institutions, the returns from market skills may not be realized because 
government officials are well-placed to take them away through corruption, excessive 
taxation, and other means of rent-extraction. In these environments, individuals with high 
market skills and low market skills will both be reluctant to invest the time, energy, and 
capital to take full advantage of reform fearing arbitrary changes in policy, corruption, and 
simple government malfeasance. Thus, there is likely to be little difference in the 
assessment of economic reform between high and low skilled respondents.   
According to the complementarity view, democracy and strong governance 
institutions drive a wedge between the preferences of those with high and low market skills 
toward economic reform. This view predicts significantly larger differences in the attitudes 
towards economic reform between those with and without market skills under good 
institutions than under bad institutions.    
1.2. Substitutability view 
 In contrast, the substitutability argument envisions democracy and good governance 
institutions primarily as increasing the motives and means for governments to engage in 
redistribution. It predicts that when democracy and governance institutions are strong, the 
differences in support for market reform between the low and high skilled will be smaller. 
Democracy increases incentives to use policy to redistribute benefits to groups harmed by 
economic reform and good governance institutions can increase state capacity to deliver 
these benefits.  The gains from economic reform may be distributed more evenly across the 
population under democracy and good governance because those who gain little from 
economic reform are better compensated through redistribution paid for by those who gain 
more from economic reforms.  This argument has particular bite when the benefits of 
economic reform accrue to a small minority (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Alesina and 
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Rodrik 1994). Under good institutional conditions, individuals whose skills are most 
appropriate for the market will be less fervent supporters of economic reform and those 
whose skills are less well suited to a market economy will be less strident opponents of 
reform due to redistribution. 
According to the substitutability view, good institutions substitute for market skill 
differences in shaping public support for economic reform; and, therefore we expect 
smaller differences in the assessment of economic reform between individuals with 
different levels of market skills in good compared to bad institutional environments. 
 We test the complementarity and substitutability views by comparing the actual 
levels of popular support for revising market reforms for groups with high and low market 
skills in good and bad institutional environments. Our approach has an attractive feature: 
because we consider attitudes towards economic reform ex post, i.e., the attitudes of 
individuals who have already realized the gains and losses from economic reform, it 
implicitly takes into account the possibility of redistribution and government predation. 
Potential winners may gain little from economic reform because the (potential) gains may 
be redistributed or simply taxed away by subsequent government policy.  Thus, we treat the 
ex-post individual assessment of reform as a proxy for the realized net effect of policy 
change on the welfare of the individual.   
2. Data sources and summary 
2.1. A measure of support for economic reform 
 To study public support for economic reform, we focus on a critical component of 
building a market economy in transition countries: the privatization of state enterprises 
(Boycko et al. 1995; Megginson 2005). We use the “Life in Transition Survey” (LiTS), a 
survey based on face-to-face interviews using a representative sample of 1,000 individuals 
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in each of 28 postcommunist countries conducted in the fall of 2006.8 More specifically, 
we focus on responses to the following question from the survey: 
 In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? They  
  should be… 
 (1) Left in the hands of current owners with no change; 
 (2) Left in the hands of current owners provided they pay privatized assets’  
  worth; 
 (3) Renationalized and kept in state hands; 
 (4) Renationalized and then re-privatized again using a more transparent   
  process. 
Figure 1 here. 
 Figure 1 summarizes responses to this question. We dichotomize the responses by 
treating answers 1 and 2 as indicating opposition to revising privatization and responses 3 
and 4 as signaling support for revising privatization.  For our purposes, the critical 
distinction between these two groups is that the latter two responses entail the expropriation 
of privatized assets held by current owners – either by re-nationalization or by re-
nationalization then re-privatization, while the former two responses allow the current 
                                                 
8 The survey was conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 
collaboration with the World Bank. For technical details of the survey, see EBRD (2007 a, b). 
Countries included in the study are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.   
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owners to retain their assets.9  Support for the revision of privatization is the main 
dependent variable in our empirical analysis.10  
On average, 46.7 percent of respondents in all countries support revising 
privatization by taking assets from the current owners either through renationalization or 
renationalization followed by re-privatization. This figure varies considerably across 
countries: from 67.8 percent in Azerbaijan to 24.8 percent in the Czech Republic. The 
majority of the population supports revising privatization in eleven out of twenty-eight 
countries in our sample.   Differences in question wording make direct comparisons with 
other surveys difficult, but these results are not too dissimilar from recent studies from 
Latin America. For example, Panizza and Yanez (2005) cite LatinoBarometer data from 17 
countries in 1998 which finds that 50 percent of respondents believed that “privatization 
was not beneficial for the country,” a figure that rises to over 65 percent in 2003. 
 We focus on support for revising privatization for several reasons. First, 
privatization is a key component of economic reforms in transition and developing 
countries, and removing assets from the hands of current owners marks a significant 
                                                 
9 Note that response 2 does not indicate the size of the payment that current owners should make. 
Therefore, we choose to be conservative and treat response 2 as support for the status quo, as the 
payment may just be an indication of respondent’s preference for increased taxation. This question 
has a number of shortcomings. In particular, it refers to “most” privatized enterprises rather than 
offering a more precise wording. It would also be improved with a filter that asked whether 
anything should be done about privatized enterprises before listing the responses. The order of the 
responses minimizes the problem somewhat by offering the status quo as the first response. 
10 Taking into account refusals, failures to locate respondents, and other administrative difficulties, 
the response rate for this survey is 63%, a rate that is roughly equivalent to the response rate of the 
widely used National Election Studies in the US and the American Time Use Survey (Singer 2002). 
The non-response rates varied significantly across countries. However, the overall non-response 
rates as well as outright refusal rates are uncorrelated across countries with our main dependent 
variable, i.e., the support for revising privatization. 
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change in the economic and political environment. Even the threat of revising privatization 
can have important economic consequences by weakening the incentives of current owners 
to invest in their business. Second, privatization and its possible revision are high profile 
policies that have engendered great public debate which increases the likelihood that 
respondents have given the issue some thought.  Third, the survey has a relatively clean 
question on support for and opposition to revising privatization that is comparable across 
countries. Our empirical results are unchanged when we use a more general question from 
the survey which asks directly about “support for a market economy” as a dependent 
variable, but we prefer to focus on the revision of privatization as a more concrete example 
of support for economic reforms (as we discuss in the robustness section below).11  
2.2. Measures of market-relevant skills  
 Our main focus is on market-relevant skills. We proxy for them in two ways relying 
on the type of jobs respondents hold and on their professions:  
(1) First, we consider those who have become entrepreneurs and self-employed during 
the transition as having skills particularly suitable for market economy. Economic 
reform gives new entrepreneurs an opportunity to reveal their market skills – talents 
that were not in demand before transition.  
                                                 
11 Studies from the post-communist world have examined attitudes towards market economies or 
the private sector more generally, but few focus directly on the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (c.f., Duch 1993). Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) present a formal model that incorporates the 
revision of privatization as a parameter, but offer only illustrative evidence. Frye (2006, 2007) uses 
an experiment embedded in surveys of business elites and the mass public in Russia to examine 
support for revising privatization, but his findings are limited to a single country and focus on only 
a few variables of interest.  Kaltenthaler et al. (2006) estimate individual-level determinants of 
privatization support in seven post-Soviet countries, but do not account for cross-country 
differences in the quality of institutions. There is a very large literature on the politics of 
privatization in the postcommunist world, but much of it focuses on elite decisionmaking rather 
than mass support for the policy (c.f., Shleifer and Treisman 2000; Appel 2004). 
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(2) Second, we deem those respondents who hold high managerial positions and work 
as top-level professionals (i.e., groups 1 and 2 in the 1-digit Standard Occupational 
Classification 2000) as having high levels of market-relevant skills. Top level 
professionals and company managers have skills especially rewarded in a market 
economy where the wage distribution is substantially less compressed than in a 
command economy. We refer to these occupations as professionals in our 
analysis.12   
Seven percent of respondents are entrepreneurs and ten percent are professionals in 
our sample. The rest of respondents work for wages in the occupational groups 3 to 9 or do 
not work.13 By construction, there is no overlap in these two groups, i.e., entrepreneurs and 
professionals; but we argue that both groups have skills with potentially high returns under 
a market economy. 
Other conventional measures of human capital, such as education and experience 
(proxied by age), are poor indicators of market skills in a postcommunist environment.  
                                                 
12 These occupations include legislators, senior government officials, enterprise managers, 
director/chief executives, owners of businesses, physicists, engineers, mathematicians, architects, 
computing professionals, medical doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers, lawyers, accountants, 
professionals and similar occupations.   
13 Some questions in the survey are rather demanding for respondents. For example, the technical 
appendix of the LiTS notes that in some cases interviewers provided guidance to some respondents 
in describing their employment history and their occupation. It is possible that interviewers 
provided guidance on other questions as well, but we have no way of detecting if this is the case.  
This possibility introduces the potential for interviewer bias, particularly among respondents with 
lower education. We address this issue in two ways. First, we control for education in our analysis. 
Second, we verified that the distributions of occupations for the one case where we have 
comparable data (Russia) are similar between LiTS and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS). RLMS applies a methodology, which is much less demanding for respondents: 
their verbal answers are recorded and then placed into occupational categories after the survey is 
completed.  
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Much of the work experience gained by those who worked for many years under the 
command economy is likely to be of little value in a more open market economy (Guriev 
and Zhuravskaya 2009). Similarly, education, particularly vocational education, prior to 
1990 (and in some cases for several years after) was designed to prepare citizens to perform 
tasks relevant to a planned economy – tasks that are largely obsolete in a market 
environment. Note that we always control for these common measures of human capital in 
our analysis.    
2.3. Measures of the institutional environment 
Our focus is on whether the impact of market skills on support for economic reform 
is contingent on the level of democracy and the quality of governance. Given disagreement 
about how best to measure democracy, we use four indicators, including the executive 
constraints and democracy measures from POLITY IV, the voice measure from Kaufmann 
et al. (2006), and the Freedom House Nations in Transit index (democracy progress score). 
Each of these commonly used measures of democracy has strengths and weaknesses. The 
two POLITY measures are based on relatively less subjective indicators, but the rating for 
executive constraints has a rather low ceiling.14  The Freedom House measure seems to 
provide a closer fit with the secondary literature in the transition countries than the 
POLITY measures, but is based on rather subjective measures.   The voice measure from 
Kaufmann et al. (2006) is also based in part on subjective measures as captured by 
national-level surveys.  Our measures of governance quality also come from Kaufmann et 
al. (2006). We use the following indices: government effectiveness, the rule of law, control 
over corruption, and regulatory quality. Even though there are 28 countries in the LiTS 
                                                 
14 In our data, more than half the countries have the highest or second highest level of executive 
constraint on the 1-7 scale. See Treier and Jackman (2008) for a discussion of drawbacks of the 
POLITY IV continuous measures of democracy. 
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survey, most of the institutional measures are not available for Montenegro; in addition, the 
POLITY measures are not available for Bosnia. As a consequence, our sample consists of 
27 countries (or 26 when we use the Democracy Index). We describe and summarize each 
of our main variables of interest as well as all control variables (to be introduced below) in 
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. 
3. Empirical Methodology 
To test our hypotheses about the complementarity or substitutability of market-relevant 
skills and democracy and governance institutions, we compare individual support for 
revising privatization between groups which do and do not have market-relevant skills in 
good and bad institutional environments controlling for a wide range of individual and 
country characteristics.  
As a first step (before we proceed to the core of our analysis), we want to establish 
the benchmark of an average effect of market-relevant skills on support for revising 
privatization controlling for all country-level variation. For that purpose, we conduct the 
following Probit estimation: 
,      (1) 
where i indexes individuals and c indexes countries in which individual i lives; Ri is a 
dummy which equals one if the individual i supports revising privatization; Ei is a dummy 
indicating entrepreneurs and self-employed; and Pi is a dummy indicating individuals 
working as professionals and top managers.  is a country fixed effect. Xi is a vector of 
individual covariates; it includes a range of factors that may shape support for economic 
reform and may be correlated with market-relevant skills. The LiTS data offer a rich set of 
control variables related to individuals’ transition experiences, including labor market 
history and hardships that individuals experienced between 1989 and 2006.  In particular, 
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we control for how long the respondents worked for wages in the state and private sectors, 
the number of different jobs they held, the number of years that respondents experienced 
food cuts, wage arrears, and whether they had to sell household assets to make ends meet. 
The list of individual controls also includes various proxies for relative and absolute 
income and wealth of the respondent, as well as the respondent’s perception of his or her 
position in the wealth distribution from the beginning of transition to 2006.  In addition, we 
control for age, education level, gender, location of residence (rural vs. urban vs. 
metropolitan area), religion, whether the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority, and 
current labor market status (employed vs. unemployed).  
 In this specification, we use bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering of a 
heteroscedastic error term at the level of primary sampling units (PSUs), i.e., 50 residential 
locations drawn at random within each country.15 Equation (1) estimates the average effects 
of market-relevant skills on the support of privatization revision,  and , which are 
expected to be negative. 
3.1 National Institutions and Individual Skills 
Our primary interest, however, is in whether the effect of market-relevant skills on 
support for revising privatization depends on a country’s institutional environment. Thus, 
as a second step in our analysis, we introduce interaction effects between variables 
measuring democracy and governance institutions and variables measuring market skills. 
Since this approach requires the use of variables measured at two different levels, i.e., 
                                                 
15 The sample selection consisted of two stages. First, 50 primary sampling units (PSUs) were 
randomly selected in each country based on information from the most recent census in the country. 
Second, 20 households were selected at random from each PSU. Within each household, the head 
of the household (or another knowledgeable household member) responded to the questions on 
aspects of material well-being, while for the other questions one household member (aged 18 or 
over) was randomly selected to respond. 
 16
individual and country-level, we estimate three alternative models designed to handle 
multi-level data, each of which has its desirable and undesirable features. We begin with a 
Probit model with country fixed effects, which is a direct generalization of equation (1): 
, (2) 
where Ic denotes a particular measure of institutional environment of country c (i.e., one of 
our proxies for democracy or governance quality). Superscript d at Ic indicates that we 
subtract the overall sample mean from the institutional measure Ic before taking the cross-
term in order for  and  to have the same interpretation as in (1), i.e., the effect of 
market-relevant skills evaluated at the average level of the institutional environment. We 
include institutional measures in these regressions one-by-one, because they are highly 
correlated with each other and consider them simply as alternative measures of democracy 
and governance quality. The rest of the notation and the assumptions about the variance-
covariance matrix are unchanged.   
The coefficients on the interaction terms,  and , test for the complementarity 
and the substitutability of institution I with individual market skills. If they have the same 
sign as the direct effect of market skills (i.e., are negative), we would conclude that there is 
a complementarity of skills and institutions. In contrast, if  and  have the opposite 
sign of the direct effect of market skills (i.e., are positive), then, skills and institutions are 
substitutes.  
In addition, in order to highlight the direct effect of institutions, I, we estimate a 
probit model without country fixed effects, but with the direct effect of I as an additional 
covariate.  In the following specification, we cluster the error term at the level of countries 
which is necessary as we include national-level variables in the list of covariates. As above, 
standard errors are bootstrapped.  
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.  (3) 
Since equation (3) omits country fixed effects, we control for the following national-level 
variables (Zc): the extent of country’s large and small privatization in 2006 as measured by 
the EBRD and the log per capita GDP averaged for 1999-2006, as both income and the 
extent of privatization may shape the support for revising privatization.16 The estimation of 
the parameter  in (3) is purely auxiliary because institutions are likely endogenous to 
public attitudes towards market reforms and we do not claim to establish direct causality 
from the level of institutions to support for privatization revision. We discuss this issue (as 
well as the effect of the endogeneity of institutions for the estimation of our parameters of 
interest) in detail in the next subsection.  
Estimating equation (3) with a probit model has the advantage of simplicity and 
ease of computation, but only partially recognizes the nested structure of the data: 
responses from many individuals who reside in a small number of countries (Leoni 2009).17 
To make sure that our results are not driven by potential problems with the probit 
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix, we estimate equation (3) using two additional 
methods. First, we estimate a one-step two-level model using a Generalized Linear Latent 
and Mixed Model (GLLAMM) which takes into account that the data reside in two-levels 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Finally, we estimate a two-step model which also 
                                                 
16 We also investigated the direct effect and the interaction with market skills of the following 
potentially important national-level variables: inequality, growth, type and mode of privatization 
(e.g., insider vs. outsider; voucher vs. direct sales), years since privatization. None of them had a 
robust effect on  support for revising privatization or had any effect on our main findings. We 
discuss this in the robustness section below.  
17 Clustering of standard errors is designed for data sets with a relatively small number of 
observations drawn from many groups. In the case when the unmeasured residual country-level 
variance is trivial, clustered standard errors perform well, but in the presence of large unmeasured 
residual country-level variance, this approach produces biased standard errors (Leoni 2009).   
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accounts for the nested structure of the data (Huber et al. 2005).18 This procedure begins by 
estimating a probit model for each country using individual-level predictors, gathers the 
coefficients on the constants and individual-level variables which are then used as the 
dependent variables in second stage estimations with national-level variables as predictors 
(one at a time).  The estimates of the national-level variables are weighted in accordance 
with the precision of the first-level estimates (Borjas and Sueyoshi 1994). This method is 
less efficient than one-step estimators, such as GLLAMM, but requires fewer distributional 
assumptions about the data (Beck 2005; Leoni 2009). Both GLLAMM and the two-step 
method take into account the fact that we have only 27 country-level observations of the 
institutional environment. To the extent that the results are consistent across estimation 
procedures, we are more confident in them. 
3.2 Endogeneity of Institutions 
 There are a number of reasons to believe that the level of democracy and the quality 
of governance institutions are endogenous to public support of market reforms in general 
and of privatization in particular.19 Most importantly, crucial omitted variables, such as the 
quality and timing of reforms themselves, are likely correlated with both the quality of the 
institutional environment and public support for reforms. One can also argue that reverse 
causality is a potential problem for estimating the direct effect of institutions on public 
attitudes towards privatization as many of the institutional quality indices are themselves a 
compilation of survey responses, which to some extent may have been based on expert or 
public assessments of privatization. Note that this particular source of endogeneity is 
probably less damaging for the democracy variables than for the governance indicators as 
                                                 
18 For discussions of multi-level data analysis see the special issue of Political Analysis vol. 13, 4, 
(2005), which is dedicated to multi-level models, and Gelman and Hill (2007). 
19See Grosjean and Senik (2008) for an interesting approach to finding a source of exogenous 
variation in democracy. 
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experts and survey respondents can more easily distinguish between privatization and 
political rights; moreover, POLITY IV measures of democracy do not include survey 
responses.   
Our main focus, however, is on the interaction between the (endogenous) 
institutional variables and our measures of market-relevant skills conditional on the effect 
of the institutional environment (either by controlling for country fixed effects or by the 
direct inclusion of institutional covariates). Our main identification assumption is that 
omitted variables and other potential sources of endogeneity of the institutional 
environment affect responses of individuals with high and low market skills to the same 
extent irrespective of the institutional environment. Thus, under this assumption, we can 
estimate the difference-in-differences effect of the interaction between market skills and 
institutions without a bias by comparing the difference in the support of market reforms 
between groups with low and high market skills in good and bad institutional 
environments.   
Table 1 here 
4. Results 
4.1. Benchmark: Market skills in an average institutional environment 
 Table 1 presents the results of an estimation using individual-level factors as 
independent variables and controlling for all country-level variation (including institutions) 
with country fixed effects. Most importantly, we find that our measures of market skills are 
good predictors of support for the privatization status quo.  Being a professional decreases 
the probability of supporting the revision of privatization on average by 4.1 percentage 
points.  In addition, new entrepreneurs are on average 5.1 percentage points less likely to 
support revision of privatization than non-entrepreneurs.  Thus, controlling for other 
 20
factors, individuals with skills suited for an economy with extensive private ownership are 
especially likely to oppose revising privatization. 
 The relationship between other measures of human capital and attitudes toward 
revising privatization is weaker. This is, perhaps, because in transition economies these 
measures do not reflect the possession of skills specific to a market economy. Most 
notably, the level of education is statistically insignificant.20 Age – often used in the 
literature as a proxy for experience – is positively related to support for revising 
privatization. The most likely reason for this relationship is that experience under a 
command economy does not help adjusting to new market conditions (e.g., Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya 2009). Note that the results are unchanged  if we include a squared term for 
age in the list of regressors.  
 In addition, we find that employment trajectories are related to support for revising 
privatization.  Respondents who held more jobs are more likely to favor revising 
privatization, while those who worked longer in the private sector are more vigorous 
opponents of revising privatization. Individuals who experienced extensive economic 
hardships related to transition are significantly more likely to favor revising privatization. 
Respondents from higher consumption deciles and those who own a home or an apartment 
and those moved up the wealth ladder during the transition support the revision of 
privatization significantly less than their counterparts with lower incomes and wealth and a 
                                                 
20 In an alternative specification with dummies for each level of education, only the holders of a 
university degree have significantly lower support for revising privatization than all other education 
groups. Note that all of the top managers and professionals are in that category; nonetheless, the 
coefficient on the dummy indicating top-level managers and professionals remains significant in 
this specification. Results from Latin America are inconclusive about the impact of education on 
support for privatization (Boix 2005, Graham and Sukhtankar 2004, Lora and Panizza 2003, 
Panizza and Yanez 2005). 
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less positive wealth trajectory during transition. The unemployed are significantly more 
likely to support a revision of privatization than the employed.21 
Table 2 here 
4.2. Market skills in different institutional environments 
We now turn to the most important part of our analysis, i.e., testing for the 
complementarity or substitutability of democracy and good governance with market skills 
of individuals. We begin by exploring the impact of market skills conditional on the level 
of democracy and governance using single-stage estimations in Table 2. The first two 
columns present coefficients and marginal effects of the interaction terms between 
measures of market skills and institutions from the probit estimations with country fixed 
effects (i.e., equation 2). The top panel of the table presents results for democracy; and the 
lower panel for governance institutions. The results are consistent with the view that both 
democracy and good governance institutions complement private returns to skill from 
economic reform. In regressions for all our measures of institutions without exception, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms between the relevant institution, on the one hand, and 
the dummy variables for entrepreneur and for professional or top manager, on the other 
hand, are negative and statistically significant. Therefore, as democratic institutions grow 
stronger and governance improves, the difference in the support for revising privatization 
between groups with high market skills and low market skills increases: those with market 
                                                 
21 That respondents in transition countries appear to be able to evaluate privatization in line with 
their material interests is an interesting finding. While privatization is a high profile policy that is 
often discussed in the media, it is also a technically complex policy that is a “hard” issue for the 
public to decipher (Carmines and Stimson 1980).  Moreover, recent analyses of public support for 
privatization from Latin America produce few consistent results (Boix 2005, Graham and 
Sukhtankar 2004, Lora and Panizza 2003, Panizza and Yanez 2005).  
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skills become stronger opponents of the revision of privatization relative to those without 
market skills. 
 In Columns 3 and 4, we report results from a probit estimation without country 
fixed effects but with the direct effect of the relevant institution included and clusters by 
country (i.e., equation 3). The results comport well with the results based on the fixed 
effects estimation. Again, all interaction terms are negative and statistically significant 
(with one exception: the coefficient on the interaction between professionals and executive 
constraints is negative but insignificant). In Column 5, we repeat this estimation using 
GLLAMM, and despite the small number of second-level observations, the results again 
are consistent. Overall, the results strongly support the complementarity argument.  
Figure 2 here 
 To illustrate the magnitude of our results, we predict probabilities of support for 
revising privatization with their confidence intervals for groups with high and low market 
skills at each level of institutional quality using Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations 
are based on a probit estimation similar to the one reported in Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 
(i.e., equation 3).22 Using the results of these simulations, we generated a series of graphs.  
Figure 2 illustrates the differences in the predicted probability of support for the revision of 
privatization for individuals with and without market skills under varying levels of 
democracy as measured by POLITY IV’s executive constraints variable. The graphs in the 
left column from the top to the bottom present predicted probabilities of support for 
revising privatization for 1) professionals compared to non-professionals, 2) entrepreneurs 
compared to non-entrepreneurs, and 3) a group of entrepreneurs and professionals 
                                                 
22 The only difference is that simulations use clustering at the level of PSUs rather than countries. 
For these simulations, we use Clarify software designed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; it 
does not allow the use of clusters by country as there are only 27 countries. As reported in Table 2, 
the results are generally robust to clustering by country and by PSU.  
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compared to a group of non-entrepreneurs and non-professionals for each possible level of 
constraints on executives (in the range present in our data).  The graphs in the right column 
depict the change in the predicted probability of supporting a revision of privatization 
associated with a move from 1) a professional to a non-professional, 2) an entrepreneur to a 
non-entrepreneur, 3) and an entrepreneur or a professional to a non-entrepreneur and non-
professional, for each level of executive constraints with 95 percent confidence intervals.    
 The first thing to note from these graphs is that at low levels of democracy there is 
no appreciable difference in the attitudes towards the revision of privatization between 
professionals and non-professional and between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs – 
groups with and without market skills have very high levels of support for revising 
privatization. At the lowest level of constraints on executives (i.e., as in Uzbekistan), the 
rate of support for the revision of privatization is at its peak (70 percent) for all groups 
regardless of market skills. As democracy becomes more robust, market skills begin to 
matter. For example, when the executive constraint score is at its maximum, which is the 
modal value for countries in our sample, moving from a professional to a non-professional 
increases the probability of supporting the revision of privatization by 5 percentage points 
and moving from an entrepreneur to a non-entrepreneur increases this probability by 10 
percentage points. The effect of market skills is especially pronounced if we compare the 
support for revising privatization between entrepreneurs and professionals as one group and 
non-entrepreneurs and non-professionals as the other group, as we do in the bottom row of 
Figure 2.  When the executive constraints measure is at its peak, a change from being either 
an entrepreneur or a professional to being a non-professional non-entrepreneur is associated 
with an increase in the predicted probability of support for revising privatization of about 
15 percentage points (with 10 being the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval). 
At this level of democracy, 40 percent of individuals in the group with low market skills 
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support revising privatization; whereas the rate of support for revising privatization is only 
about 25 percent among those with high market skills. The bottom right graph shows that if 
the executive constraint measure falls below 4 (the level of Russia), the differences in 
attitudes towards privatization are not statistically significant for those with and without 
market skills; whereas for a level of constraints on executives above the level of Russia, 
these differences are statistically significant.    
  Figure 3 here 
 Similar graphs in Figure 3 illustrate the results for regulatory quality. Again, we see 
that the difference in the rate of support for the revision of privatization between non-
professionals and professionals and between non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs increases 
with the quality of the regulatory environment.  More specifically, as shown in the top row 
of the figure, moving from a professional to a non-professional increases the probability of 
supporting a revision of privatization by about 2 percentage points when regulatory quality 
is at the 25th percentile (-0.69, which is approximately equal to the level of regulatory 
quality in Georgia) and by about 7 percentage points when regulatory quality is at the 75th 
percentile (0.66, which is approximately the level of Slovak Republic). The middle row 
indicates that an increase in support for the privatization status quo associated with moving 
from an entrepreneur to a non-entrepreneur is even more striking. At the level of regulatory 
quality of Georgia, becoming an entrepreneur decreases support for revising privatization 
by about 5 percentage points, but at the level of regulatory quality of the Slovak Republic, 
this decrease is roughly 12 percentage points. The graphs in the bottom row, again, indicate 
that the greatest differences emerge if we combine different aspects of market skills (i.e., 
professional status and entrepreneurship). The corresponding figures are 7 and 18 
percentage points, respectively. For the highest level of regulatory quality in our sample 
(Estonia), the rate of support for revising privatization is 35 percent for the group with no 
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market skills, whereas it is 15 percent for the group with market skills. The differences in 
support for revising privatization for the two groups become statistically significant at the 
level of regulatory quality above Azerbaijan (-0.85). The results using other measures of 
democracy and quality of governance are similar. 
      Table 3 Here 
 Finally, we report estimations of support for revising privatization using the two-
stage method as suggested by Huber et al. (2005). Table 3 presents coefficients from the 
second-stage estimation. The top panel reports results using the measures of democracy and 
the bottom panel for the quality of governance measures. The results for interactions 
between market skills and institutions, reported in Columns 3 and 4, are somewhat weaker 
but consistent in certain respects with the probit and the GLLAMM results (reported in 
Table 2). The coefficients on the interaction between the measures of democracy and the 
dummy variable for entrepreneurship reported are always negative, but reach conventional 
levels of significance in only two of four regressions (Column 3). (In a third regression the 
p-value of the estimated coefficient is 0.12.) The coefficients on the interaction terms 
between our four measures of democracy and a dummy variable for professionals and top 
managers have the correct signs, but are statistically insignificant (Column 4).   
 The coefficients on the interaction terms of our measures of governance and the 
dummy variables for entrepreneurs have the correct sign, but do not approach statistical 
significance (Column 3). In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the 
four governance measures and the dummy for professionals and top managers are always 
significant and negative.  It is important to note that the loss of statistical power is expected 
given the limitations of having very few (26 to 27) observations in the second-stage 
regressions.  Overall, a consistent pattern of results emerges from the three different 
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estimation procedures, which supports the view of complementarity of skills and 
institutions.   
4.3. Direct effect of institutional environment 
 Thus far we have examined the impact of market skills on support for revising 
privatization under varying institutional environments, but have not looked at whether 
institutions themselves are correlated with support for the revision of privatization. If 
democracy and good governance institutions help the population at large to gain from 
reform, then one might expect these national-level variables to be negatively associated 
with support for the revision of privatization.23 The two-stage model advocated by Huber et 
al. (2005) permits an exploration of the direct effects of the national-level variables on 
individual-level responses. As the estimates of the effect of national-level variables in the 
two-stage method are not invariant to the scaling of the individual-level variables, we 
present the results for an average respondent and for a respondent who is a 40-year old 
female from the 5th income decile (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, respectively). Each of our 
four measures of democracy and governance significantly reduce the levels of support for 
revising privatization for a 40-year old female; and this is also true for an average 
respondent with the exception of the insignificant effect of the democracy index.  Thus, on 
average citizens in more democratic and better governed countries express lower levels of 
support for revising privatization.24  
                                                 
23 This view is consistent with the complementarity argument. Both low and high skilled benefit 
from economic reform, but the high skilled benefit more under good governance and democracy, 
and therefore are more ardent supporters of the privatization status quo. 
24 These estimates of the direct effects are consistent with the results of other estimation procedures, 
i.e., GLLAMM and probit, reported in Table 2 and Table A3. Table A3 in the appendix reports 
GLLAMM and probit results without the interaction terms. Here, the only difference with other 
reported results is that in the probit estimations the coefficients of the direct effects of the 
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The results on the direct effects of institutions are merely suggestive of correlations 
and limited in at least two important respects. First, and most importantly, institutions are 
endogenous (as we discuss in the Section 3.2). Second, the number of second-level 
observations (countries) is relatively small. 
5. Robustness Checks  
In the main part of our analysis we focus on support for the revision of privatization 
as a critical component of opposition to economic reform, but our results apply to public 
attitudes towards the market more generally. In particular, the results hold if we use 
responses to the following question in the survey as a dependent variable:  
With which of these statements do you agree with most: 
 1) A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system;   
 2) Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a  
  market economy;   
 3) For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system is  
  organized as a market economy or as a planned economy. 
 
We repeated our analysis using a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
chose options 2 or 3, and 0, if the respondent chose option 1. This measure is highly 
correlated in our baseline measure of support for revision of privatization (the correlation 
coefficient is about 0.18 with p-value substantially below one percent). The results are 
robust to using support for the market as a dependent variable. The signs of the coefficients 
of interest are always the same; the magnitudes of the coefficients are often a little smaller; 
but the coefficients remain statistically significant in the vast majority of cases. Note that 
some loss of statistical significance is to be expected given a larger measurement error in 
this question, which is more generally formulated and is not directly focused on reform per 
se, but on the existence of a market economy.    
                                                                                                                                                    
governance variables are not statistically significant with the exception of control of corruption, 
which is marginally significant.   
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We also investigated whether institutions interact with other commonly used measures 
of human capital: education, age (as a proxy for experience), and health. No significant 
interactions effects were found. These results indicate that measures of human capital based 
on age and education are poor proxies for market-relevant skills in transition countries.  
We further verified the robustness of our results by limiting the age of respondents to 
60 and below to ensure that our results are not driven by the views of the retired 
population.   
  We also experimented with different model specifications. Because we have few 
second-level observations, we are somewhat limited in the number of independent 
variables that we can include in our estimations.  Nevertheless, we also added variables for 
GDP growth from 1999-2006 and current levels of inequality to our estimations, but these 
variables were not significantly related to support for revising privatization and did not 
influence our main results.  While our results do not indicate that the impact of market skill 
on support for reform is conditional on economic inequality, this result may be specific to 
the postcommunist cases.  Where economic inequality is on average higher, as in Latin 
America, the incentives for politicians to redistribute the gains from reform obtained by the 
highly skilled may be stronger because the median voter is more likely to be low skilled 
(Meltzer and Richards 1981). This logic is more compatible with the substitution 
hypothesis. In contrast, where economic inequality is lower, as in much of Western Europe, 
the complementarity logic may have more bite.  
 We also examined whether the type of privatization (voucher versus non-voucher) 
or the method of privatization (sale versus give away) influenced support for revising 
privatization directly and through interaction with market skills.  These variables were 
generally unrelated to support for the revision of privatization and did not change our 
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findings. However, capturing the type or method of privatization with a single measure is 
difficult and these measures are likely to be noisy. 
 We also repeated our analysis using interactions of our national-level variables with 
only one of the two measures of market skills at a time in separate estimations.  For 
example, instead of including interactions for measures of democracy and entrepreneurship 
and for democracy and professionals in each equation, we only included the latter 
interaction. The levels of statistical significance of our main variables of interest in our 
estimations remain unchanged.  
In addition, we applied a weighting scheme for the summary statistics to account for 
the fact that the LiTS data may be somewhat biased towards elderly and female 
respondents due to non-responses even though the sample was originally constructed to be 
representative. In the baseline regressions, we do not apply this weighting scheme, but 
instead, introduce controls for age and gender. When we use the weights in the regression 
analysis, the results do not change.   
 The results are also robust to dropping the two most authoritarian countries – 
Uzbekistan and Belarus – from the sample and to using the most recent values instead of 
the over-time averages for the institutional indicators.  
 Overall, our results prove to be robust. 
6. Conclusion 
 Identifying the determinants of support for economic reform has been a central 
focus of recent research in comparative political economy, but most studies rely on data 
from too few countries to make it possible to analyze the impact of national-level 
institutions on individual preferences over policy. We take advantage of a new dataset that 
allows us to explore how democracy and good governance interact with market skills to 
shape preferences over economic policy in 28 postcommunist countries.  We find that 
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under autocracy and bad governance, support for economic reform among individuals with 
market-relevant skills is not different than among individuals without market-relevant 
skills, but as quality of democracy and governance improves, the differences in support for 
economic reform between respondents with high and low market skills becomes large.  
Thus, market skills and good institutional environments are complements rather than 
substitutes. These results hold not only for public support for revising privatization, but 
also for a market economy more generally.   
 Our results indicate that theories of the politics of economic reform may benefit 
from a consideration of how the institutional environment influences individual preferences 
over policy. Most works implicitly assume that groups benefiting or poised to benefit from 
economic reform will support economic reform regardless of the institutional setting, but 
our findings indicate that preferences over economic policy are conditional on the quality 
of democracy and governance. That the impact of market skills depends on the institutional 
environment suggests that theories of the politics of economic reform that rely on those 
with more market-relevant skills to push for economic reform, may have limited relevance 
under autocracy and in weak institutional environments.  This is a potentially important 
limitation as economic reforms are often introduced in precisely these settings. Our results 
indicate that constituencies in support of economic reform may differ under democracy and 
good governance on the one hand and under autocracy and bad governance on the other.      
 More generally, our study emphasizes the value of integrating national and 
individual-level variables in the study of support for economic policy.  Whether these 
results extend to policies beyond economic reform or to other regions of the world is an 
open question, but analyzing how skills and institutions interact to shape support for policy 
change is an important agenda for future research.    
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Figure 1: Public support for revising privatization across countries  
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Note: Weights applied to ensure that the population as a whole is represented, taking into account the age and 
gender distribution of the population in each country (see EBRD 2007a: 6). The reported percentages have a 
Bernoulli distribution. Their standard errors depend on the actual percentage and the number of observations 
(1000 per country); thus, they are equal to , where pi denotes the percentage points as reported 
in the table. The magnitudes of the SE indicate that if a difference between any two countries exceeds 3 
percentage points, it is statistically significant.
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Figure 2: Predicted effect of the interaction between constraints on executives and market 
skills on the public support for privatization revision 
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Note: Graphs generated on the basis of Probit estimation with clusters on PSU using King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000) software “Clarify, 2003” available at http://gking.harvard.edu/. “plo” and “phi” indicate 
the 95% confidence interval around the change in the predicted probability indicated by “pm.” 
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Figure 3: Predicted effect of interaction between regulatory quality executives and market 
skills on the public support for privatization revision 
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Note: Graphs generated on the basis of Probit estimation with clusters on PSU using King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000) software “Clarify, 2003” available at http://gking.harvard.edu/. “plo” and “phi” indicate 
the 95% confidence interval around the change in the predicted probability indicated by “pm.” 
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Table 1. Direct individual effects. Binomial probit. Marginal effects reported. 
Coefficients Marginal effects
-0.1281*** -0.0509***
[0.0376]
-0.1036*** -0.0412***
[0.0331]
0.0044*** 0.0017***
[0.0007]
-0.007 -0.0028
[0.0107]
0.0475*** 0.0189***
[0.0127]
0.0322** 0.0128**
[0.0126]
-0.0008 -0.0003
[0.0019]
-0.0067*** -0.0027***
[0.0023]
0.0208*** 0.0083***
[0.0057]
0.0250*** 0.0099***
[0.0084]
0.0123*** 0.0049***
[0.0030]
-0.0719** -0.0286*
[0.0337]
-0.0109** -0.0043**
[0.0043]
-0.0348*** -0.0138***
[0.0048]
-0.0237 -0.0094
[0.0185]
0.0121* 0,0048*
[0.0066]
0.1007** 0.0400**
[0.0431]
0.0596 0.0237
[0.0422]
0.0145 0.0058
[0.1027]
0.0387 0.0154
[0.0393]
0.1895*** 0.0753***
[0.0636]
-0.0114 -0.0045
[0.0723]
0.0142 0.0057
[0.0419]
0.0865** 0.0344**
[0.0340]
Country dummies Yes***
Observations 24311
Pseudo R-squared 0.0647
Log Likelihood -15716
Prob>Chi-squared 0.0000
Bootstrapped standard errrors in brackets clustered at PSU level. Country fixed effects included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Market Skills:
Professional or top manager
Probability of supporting privatization revision
Transition-related employment history:
Human capital:
Age 
Education  [1-below secondary, 2-secondary, 
Entrepreneur or self-employed
Years had to sell household assets, 1989-2006
                      3-professional, vocational training, 4-higher]
Self-reported poor health status [1-excellent, …, 5-poor]
Location="Metropolitan area" - comparison group
Assets:
Ownership of a house or apartment
Other individual-level controls:
Gender [Male compared to Female]
Years worked for wages in state sector, 1989-2006
Years worked for wages in private sector, 1989-2006
Unemployed, 2006
               ="Buddhist"
               ="Atheistic / agnostic / none"
               ="Muslim"
               ="Other"
Member of an ethnic minority
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989-2006
Number of jobs, 1989-2006
Religion="Christian"  - comparison group
Wealth (Decile of per capita household consumption)
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006
Household size
Transition-related hardships:
Years had wage cuts or wage arrears, 1989-2006
               ="Rural"
               ="Urban, excluding metropolitan area"
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Table 2. Interactions effects for institutions and measures of market skills
Estimation model: GLLAMM
Specification: Two-levels: 
individual and 
country
Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients N obs.
Democratic institutions and Entrepeneur
(1)  Democracy index -0.0558*** -0.0222*** -0.0279***
[0.0185] [0.0080]
Entrepeneur X  Democracy index -0.0433*** -0.0172*** -0.0396*** -0.0158*** -0.0400***
[0.0120] [0.0123] [0.0109]
Professional X  Democracy index -0.0191* -0.0076* -0.0159* -0.0063* -0.0182**
[0.0100] [0.0094] [0.0088] 22 457
(2) Voice & accountability -0.3347*** -0.1332*** -0.3561***
[0.0972] [0.0345]
Entrepeneur X Voice & accountability -0.1468*** -0.0584*** -0.1351*** -0.0538*** -0.1415***
[0.0477] [0.0490] [0.0409]
Professional  X Voice & accountability -0.0932** -0.0371** -0.0911** -0.0362** -0.1000**
[0.0378] [0.0443] [0.0400] 23 387
(3) Controls on executives -0.1208*** -0.0480*** -0.0893***
[0.0217] [0.0084]
Entrepeneur X Controls on executives -0.0689*** -0.0274*** -0.0544*** -0.0216*** -0.0670***
[0.0187] [0.0187] [0.0170]
Professional  X Controls on executives -0.0339** -0.0135** -0.0289 -0.0115 -0.0322*
[0.0168] [0.0180] [0.0170] 23 381
(4) Democracy freedom house -0.1665*** -0.0662*** -0.1315***
[0.0488] [0.0176]
Entrepeneur X Democracy freedom house -0.0730*** -0.0290*** -0.0742** -0.0295** -0.0692**
[0.0276] [0.0308] [0.0280]
Professional  X Democracy freedom house -0.0529** -0.0210** -0.0463* -0.0184* -0.0531**
[0.0207] [0.0240] [0.0213] 23 494
Governance institutions and Entrepeneur
(5) Government Effectivness -0.27 -0.1074 -0.1346***
[0.1824] [0.0504]
Entrepeneur X  Government Effectivness -0.1706** -0.0679** -0.1872** -0.0745** -0.1978**
[0.0664] [0.0910] [0.0911]
Professional  X  Government Effectivness -0.1508*** -0.0600*** -0.1620*** -0.0645*** -0.1478***
[0.0504] [0.0570] [0.0564] 23 387
(6) Rule of law -0.1561 -0.0621 -0.2610***
[0.1394] [0.0314]
Entrepeneur X Rule of law -0.1813*** -0.0721*** -0.1762** -0.0701** -0.2065***
[0.0646] [0.0687] [0.0743]
Professional  X Rule of law -0.1495*** -0.0595*** -0.1726*** -0.0687*** -0.1534***
[0.0446] [0.0525] [0.0533] 23 387
(7) Control of corruption -0.2579* -0.1026* -0.1876***
[0.1457] [0.0273]
Entrepeneur X Control of corruption -0.1518* -0.0604* -0.1802** -0.0717** -0.1621*
[0.0792] [0.0881] [0.0896]
Professional  X Control of corruption -0.1723*** -0.0685*** -0.1948*** -0.0775*** -0.1825***
[0.0540] [0.0633] [0.0584] 23 387
(8) Regulatory quality -0.2471 -0.0983 -0.4007***
[0.1554] [0.0423]
Entrepeneur X Regulatory quality -0.1479*** -0.0588*** -0.1465** -0.0583** -0.1389***
[0.0536] [0.0605] [0.0516]
Professional  X Regulatory quality -0.1024*** -0.0407*** -0.1074** -0.0427** -0.0994**
[0.0376] [0.0526] [0.0426] 23 387
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 The first column indicates 8 separate regressions run for each model (one regression for each institutional variable).
Probability of supporting privatization revision
Cluster by country, Bootstrapped 
SEs
ProbitProbit
Country fixed effects,  cluster by 
PSU, Bootstrapped SEs
All regressions include all individual-level factors from Table 1 as covariates. Only the coefficients of interest are 
reported in the table. The full regression output is available from the authors. The estimated coefficients on 
“Entrepreneur” and “Professional” dummies in every regression are as reported in Table 1 because we subtract the sample 
mean from the component variables before taking cross-terms. 
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Table 3. Second stage estimates of the direct effects and interactions, Borjas weights
Institutions
Direct effect (intercept) 
evaluated at means of 
individual characteristics
Direct effect (intercept) 
evaluated at female, 40 
years old, from 5th decile
Interaction with 
entrepreneur
Interaction with 
professional or top 
manager
N 
obs.
Democracy 
Democracy index -0.083 -0.0864* -0.0292** -0.0084 26
[0.0574] [0.0476] [0.0139] [0.0164]
Voice & accountability -0.8021*** -0.6893*** -0.1179 -0.1185 27
[0.2675] [0.2419] [0.0741] [0.0836]
Controls on executives -0.1691* -0.1583** -0.0402* -0.0167 27
[0.0890] [0.0748] [0.0228] [0.0269]
Democracy freedom house -0.3417** -0.2439* -0.0225 -0.0273 27
[0.1580] [0.1266] [0.0566] [0.0538]
Governance 
Government Effectivness -1.3285*** -0.8236* -0.0589 -0.3457** 27
[0.4222] [0.4022] [0.1461] [0.1253]
Rule of law -0.8786*** -0.6753** -0.1009 -0.1912** 27
[0.2968] [0.2760] [0.0934] [0.0902]
Control of corruption -0.9141** -0.6289* -0.0176 -0.2561** 27
[0.3326] [0.3082] [0.1132] [0.0968]
Regulatory quality -1.1547*** -0.8354** -0.1357 -0.2077* 27
[0.3563] [0.3272] [0.1161] [0.1119]
GDP per capita, avg 1999-2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Privatization scale, 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Coefficients reported. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. The baseline in the first column is mean value for all individual characteristics; in the second column, 
it is a 40 years old female from the 5th income decile. Coefficients are estimates using linear regression with 
Borjas weights. Each reported coefficient is taken from a separate second-stage regression with controls for 
GDP per capita and privatization scale. 
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Appendix A  
Table A1: Description of Variables 
(1) Main variables of interest 
(1.1) Dependent variable 
Support for privatization 
revision 
Dummy equals 1 if the respondent prefers to renationalize most privatized companies and 
keep them in state hands or to renationalize most privatized companies and re-privatize 
them again using a more transparent process; 0 if the respondent prefers to leave most 
privatized companies in the hands of current owners provided that they pay what the 
assets are worth or to leave most privatized companies in the hands of current owners 
without any change. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 
2006. 
(1.2) Proxies for market skills 
Professional or top 
manager  
Dummy equals 1 if in 2006 the respondent was within working age and worked for wages 
in an occupation that requires high skills (i.e., legislators, senior government officials, 
enterprise managers, director/chief executives, owners of business, physicists, engineers, 
mathematicians, architects, computing professionals, medical doctors, dentists, 
pharmacists, teachers, lawyers, accountants, authors, professionals and similar 
occupations), 0 otherwise. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World 
Bank, 2006. 
Entrepreneur or self-
employed 
Dummy equals 1 if  the respondent moved to self-employment and entrepreneurship 
before 2006. We only refer to working-age respondents, i.e. respondents with an age 
between 18 and 60 years for any year.  Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD 
and World Bank, 2006. 
(1.3) Democracy institutions 
Democracy index  Average index of democracy for 1991-2004. Ranging from 0 to 10 with higher values 
corresponding to more democratic outcomes. The index is derived from averaging  the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (xconst). Source: Polity IV dataset, 
variable ‘democ’, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.  
Controls on executives Extent of the institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives. Average index for 1992-2004. Ranging from 1 (no regular limitations on the 
executive’s actions) to 7 (accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater 
than the executive in most areas of activity). Source: Polity IV dataset, variable ‘xconst’, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
Democracy  
freedom house 
Average democratic progress score for 1998-2006, whose scale from 1 to 7 was inverted 
such that 1 represents the lowest and 7 the highest level of democratic progress. The 
democracy score is an average of expert ratings (by Freedom House staff members and a 
panel of academic advisers) for electoral process, civil society, independent media, 
national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and 
independence, and corruption. Contrary to Polity IV, it provides a separate score for 
Serbia and Montenegro. Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
Voice & accountability Voice & accountability represents the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and free media. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. 
Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
(1.4) Governance institutions 
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness represents the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
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Table A1: Continued 
Rule of law Rule of law represents the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher values correspond to better 
governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Control of corruption Control of corruption represents the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state 
by elites and private interests. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. 
Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality represents the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002-2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
(2) Other individual-level variables  (Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006.) 
(2.1) Human capital 
Age Age of the respondent. 
Educational degree Highest educational degree obtained by the respondent, compressed to following 
categories: (1) below secondary, (2) secondary education, (3) professional, vocational 
school/training, (4) higher (university, college, post graduate). 
Self-reported poor health 
status 
Subjective assessment of the respondent’s health conditions: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) 
medium, (4) bad, (5) very bad. 
(2.2) Transition-related employment history  
Number of jobs, 1989-
2006 
Number of jobs for respondents worked for wages (for an employer) in any of the years 
from 1989 to 2006. A different job is defined by a different occupational position 
working for the same employer, by a change in the ownership type of the enterprise, and 
by a change of employer. 
Years worked for wages in 
the state sector, 1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) the respondent worked for wages in the state sector (i.e. the 
state was the owner of the company). 
Years worked for wages in 
the private sector, 1989-
2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) the respondent worked for wages in the private sector (i.e. 
the owner of the company was a private one). 
(2.3) Transition-related hardships 
Years had to accept wage 
cuts or wage arrears, 1989-
2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) the respondent had to accept wage cuts or wage arrears. 
Years had to sell 
household assets, 1989-
2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) the respondent had to sell some of the household assets. 
Years had to cut down on 
basic food consumption, 
1989-2006 
Number of years (1989-2006) the respondent had to cut down on basic food consumption. 
(2.4) Assets 
Ownership of a house or 
apartment 
Dummy indicating that any household member (including the respondent) is the majority 
owner of a house (detached, semi-detached, townhouse, terrace house, apartment, or flat). 
This information is given by the head of household (or another knowledgeable household 
member). 
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Table A1: Continued 
Wealth (Deciles of per 
capita household 
consumption) 
Approximated by the within-country deciles of total household’s annualized consumption 
expenditures per (equalized) household member. Children younger than 14 years enter 
with a weight of 0.3. The information for consumption expenditures is given by the head 
of household (or another knowledgeable household member). Our measure of wealth 
ranges from 1 to 10 based on the expenditure decile in which a respondent is located. 
Self-accessed difference 
wealth ranking b/w 1989 
and 2006 
Subjective household’s wealth ranking on an imaginary ten-step ladder (from the poorest 
to the richest), difference today with respect to 1989 (retrospective). This information is 
given by the head of household (or another knowledgeable household member). 
(2.5) Additional individual-level controls 
Gender Gender of the respondent (0=female, 1=male). 
Household size Number of household members. 
Location Location of the interviewed household in a (1) metropolitan, (2) rural, or (3) urban 
(excluding metropolitan) area. 
Religion Religion of the respondent: (1) Christian, (2) Buddhist, (3) atheistic / agnostic / none, (4) 
Muslim, (5) other. 
Member of an ethnic 
minority 
Dummy indicating that the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority in this country. 
Unemployment, 2006 Dummy equals a value of 1 if the respondent is actively looking for a job at the time of 
the survey. 
(3) Country-level controls 
Privatization scale in 2006 Degree of current privatization progress: large-scale plus small-scale privatization in 
2006. Large-scale privatization is ranked from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (more 
than 75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate 
governance). Small-scale privatization is ranked from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ 
(no state ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land). Source: EBRD 
transition indicators, http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.  
GDP per capita in USD 
1999-2006 
Real GDP per capita in USD, avg. 1999-2006, Source: EBRD selected economic 
indicators, http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm. 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable # of obs Mean SD Min Max 
Support for privatization revision 27840 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Entrepreneur or self-employed  27640 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Professional or top manager 27590 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Democracy index 26 5.82 3.22 0.0 10.0 
Controls on executives 27 5.32 1.77 1.0 7.0 
Democracy freedom house 27 3.99 1.52 1.8 6.5 
Voice & accountability 27 -0.06 0.84 -1.6 1.1 
Government effectiveness 27 -0.24 0.66 -1.2 0.8 
Rule of law 27 -0.34 0.66 -1.3 0.8 
Control of corruption 27 -0.37 0.61 -1.2 1.0 
Regulatory quality 27 -0.16 0.83 -1.8 1.3 
Privatization scale in 2006 28 7.12 1.10 3.3 8.3 
GDP per capita in USD 1999-2006 28 3405.74 3149.27 255.9 13506.4 
Age 28000 45.97 16.87 17 97 
Educational degree 27993 2.53 1.04 1 4 
Self-reported poor health status 27996 2.71 0.99 1 5 
Number of jobs, 1989-2006 27611 1.09 0.99 0 5 
Years worked for wages in the state sector, 1989-2006 27611 4.48 6.11 0 18 
Years worked for wages in the private sector, 1989-2006 27611 2.54 4.92 0 18 
Years had to accept wage cuts or arrears, 1989-2006 27450 0.57 1.87 0 18 
Years had to sell household assets, 1989-2006 27450 0.27 1.19 0 18 
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989-2006 27450 1.86 4.10 0 18 
Ownership of a house or apartment 28000 0.85 0.35 0 1 
Wealth (deciles of per capita household consumption) 28000 5.68 2.93 1 10 
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006 25179 -1.37 2.47 -9 9 
Gender (0=female, 1=male) 28000 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Household size 28000 2.81 1.66 1 12 
Location==metropolitan 28000 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Location==rural 28000 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Location==urban (excluding metropolitan) 28000 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Religion==Christian 28000 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Religion==Buddhist 28000 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Religion==atheistic/agnostic/none 28000 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Religion==Muslim 28000 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Religion==other 28000 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Member of an ethnic minority 27974 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Unemployment, 2006 28000 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Note: For the summary statistics of individual-level variables we apply weights to ensure that the population as a whole 
is represented, taking into account the age and gender distribution of the population in each country (see EBRD 2007a: 
6). The summary statistics of country-level variables refer to averages over time. For the concrete time frame for each 
variable see Table A1. 
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Table A3. Direct effects of institutions
Estimation model: GLLAMM
Specification: Two-levels: 
individual and 
country
Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients
Democracy 
 Democracy index -0.0559*** -0.0222*** -0.0148
[0.0180] [0.0092]
 Voice & accountability -0.3355*** -0.1333*** -0.4293***
[0.0949] [0.0496]
Controls on executives -0.1221*** -0.0485*** -0.0719***
[0.0211] [0.0099]
Democracy freedom house -0.1659*** -0.0660*** -0.1191***
[0.0483] [0.0374]
Governance 
Government Effectivness -0.257 -0.1021 -0.1597***
[0.1872] [0.0561]
Rule of law -0.1494 -0.0594 -0.2724***
[0.1374] [0.0286]
Control of corruption -0.2490* -0.0989* -0.3091***
[0.1500] [0.0249]
Regulatory quality -0.2435 -0.0967 -0.5227***
[0.1581] [0.0472]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Probit
Probability of supporting privatization revision
Cluster by country, Bootstrapped 
SEs
 
All regressions include all individual-level factors from Table 1 as covariates. Only the coefficients of interest are 
reported in the table. The whole regression output is available from the authors. 
